

















This paper analyses some key issues concerning the new National Pensions Reserve 
Fund. We briefly review the basic demographic and economic trends that motivate the 
establishment of the Fund. We consider the pitfalls facing the operation of the Fund and 
argue that a complete ban on domestic investment would minimise the politicisation 
problem. At least initially, the Fund should adopt an aggressive investment strategy, with 
a large equity allocation. We further argue that asset allocation should take into account 
the co-variation of returns with domestic macroeconomic and fiscal variables. Finally, we 
discuss the organisational structure of the Fund and its implications for optimal 
performance.
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1. Introduction 
 
The National Pensions Reserve Fund Act 2000 is a remarkable and innovative piece of 
economic legislation.
1 The current government has committed all future governments 
until 2055 to set aside at least one per cent of GNP each year. Moreover, the proceeds 
from the Telecom Eireann privatisation have also been added to the fund, as may the 
revenues from future sales of State assets. Over time, the Fund will become by far the 
largest investment institution in the country: a reasonable estimate is that size of the Fund 
will be equivalent to 42 percent of GNP by 2025 (Corrigan 2000). 
 
The motivation for the National Pensions Reserve Fund (hereafter the Fund) is the 
projected future increase in public pensions expenditure.
2 In the absence of pre-funding, 
future taxes would have to increase in order to maintain the level of pensions benefits. 
From an efficiency perspective, the prospect of a rising tax profile is undesirable, since it 
distorts intertemporal decisions. The alternative to increasing taxes would be to raise 
contributions, cut benefits and/or increase the retirement age. Although these reforms 
may be part of the overall policy approach to an ageing society, pre-funding expands the 
political options in pensions reform. 
 
This paper addresses some issues concerning the new Fund. We do not discuss whether 
the Fund is desirable per se. Rather, our intention is to probe the “pitfalls and 
opportunities” in the operation of the Fund. An open and informed public debate is vital 
if the Fund is to be politically sustainable: legislation can be amended and undone, so it is 
important to build widespread public support for the Fund if it is to properly perform its 
functions. 
 
This paper deals solely with the pre-funding of social welfare and public sector pensions. 
Clearly, this is only a small subset of the full range of issues posed by the prospect of an 
ageing population. Other important policy issues include: raising the retirement age; 
                                                 
1 See also Honohan and Lane (2000a), Lane (1999a, 1999b, 2000a) and Whelan (2001) for other 
commentaries on the new Fund. 
2 See Commission on Public Sector Pensions Report (2000) and Department of Finance (1998, 1999).  3 
long-term immigration policy; an EU federal fiscal system (will Ireland pay the pensions 
of retired workers in older continental European societies?); promoting pensions in the 
private sector; the financing of health care for the elderly; indexation rules (CPI versus 
earnings) for pensions; and increasing the fertility rate. The potential impact on the 
political system of inter-generational conflict regarding pensions policy is also a 
fascinating topic.  It is beyond the scope of this paper to deal with these problems.
3 
 
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the basic 
demographic and economic trends that motivate the establishment of the Fund. Section 3 
discusses some challenges facing the Fund. The Fund’s investment strategy is analysed in 
section 4 and some management principles are laid out in section 5. Section 6 offers some 
concluding remarks. 
 
2. Basic Trends 
 
Ireland currently has extremely favourable demographics. Figure 1 shows the distribution 
of age cohorts in the working-age population: in the near term, it is clear that the burden 
of extra retirees will be relatively light. 
 
However, Figures 2 and 3 and Table 1 capture the underlying motivation for establishing 
the Fund. The ratio of retirees to workers is projected to sharply rise during 2020-2050. 
In Ireland, the process is “back-loaded”, with the ratio rising most sharply towards the 
end of this interval. The budgetary impact is that public pensions expenditure is projected 
to almost double from 4.6 percent of GDP in 2000 to 9.0 percent in 2050.
4  
 
The projected net increase in public pensions expenditure --- 4.4 percent of GDP (5.1 
percent of GNP) --- is considerable.  This is in the mid- to upper- range for EU countries 
and is equivalent to almost doubling public education spending or raising income tax 
revenues by 42 percent. 
                                                 
3 See Commission on Public Sector Pensions Report (2000)  and Feldstein and Siebert (2001) for analysis 
of some of these issues. 
4 This is a baseline projection. There is considerable uncertainty about these projections which depend on 
guesses about fertility rates, migration, productivity growth and benefits levels.  4 
 
Although Table 1 shows that the scale of the pensions problem is currently far smaller in 
Ireland than in several continental European countries, the projected increase in public 
pensions expenditure is the most relevant criterion in determining the importance of pre-
funding. On this count, Ireland is in the mid- to upper- range for EU countries. Moreover, 
the fact that the Irish ageing problem kicks in at a later date than elsewhere provides a 
greater rationale for pre-funding, since returns can accumulate over a longer time period. 
 
Finally, as is vividly illustrated in Figure 3, the dramatic improvement in the public 































































Source: UN Demographic Yearbook (2000). Data are for 1996.  5 
 
Figure 2. Old Age Dependency Projections 
Old Age Dependency
Projections
































Source: European Commision (2000), Table 4.1.2. 
 
Figure 3.  Public Pension Expenditure 
Public Pensions Expenditure



































Source: European Commision (2000), Table 6.1.1.  6 
 




Source: European Commission (2000), Table 6.1.1. 
 
Figure 3. Debt/GNP ratio 
Debt/GNP Ratio






























Ireland 4.6 7.6 9
UK 5.1 4.7 3.9
France 12.1 16 15.8
Italy 14.2 15.9 13.9
Germany 10.3 13.2 14.6
Spain 9.4 12.9 17.7
Portugal 9.8  16 14.2 7 
 
 
3. Some Pitfalls 
 
 
In this section, we first discuss some potential pitfalls facing the Commission in fulfilling 
its responsibilities. We also discuss the role of the Fund in the broader public finances. 
 
 
3.1 The Politicisation of Investment 
 
There is a natural concern that state ownership of private assets can lead to an undesirable 
politicisation of the investment process.  
 
Assar Lindbeck (2000) cautions against a state-owned investment fund 
 
“There is a serious risk that future politicians will use government-controlled pension 
funds to allocate financial funds to those parts of the country where it is particularly 
important to buy votes. Politicians might also start using the voting rights in firms, based 
on share holdings, to exert influence within firms. It is naïve to think that authorities can 
create government-controlled pension funds, i.e., nationalize a large part of share 
ownership, without a severe risk that some politicians – sooner or later – will use these 
funds to buy votes or to exert direct power over firms, or both.”  
 
 
Alan Greenspan (2001) similarly has raised doubts about the desirability of state 
ownership of private assets: 
 
“I believe, as I have noted in the past, that the federal government should eschew private 
asset accumulation because it would be exceptionally difficult to insulate the 
government’s investment decisions from political pressures. Thus, over time, having the 
federal government hold significant amounts of private assets would risk sub-optimal  8 
performance by our capital markets, diminished economic efficiency, and lower overall 
standards of living than would be achieved otherwise.”  
 
There is considerable empirical evidence of political interference in the operation of state 
investment funds. Iglesias and Palacios (2000) document that returns can be inversely 
related to the degree of political interference. Sorensen et al (2001) show that reserve 
funds are often raided by US states during recessions when local tax revenues are under 
pressure.  
 
In response to such concerns, the government has delegated responsibility for the fund to 
an independent Commission. However, this does not provide complete insulation, since 
the commissioners will be politically appointed to temporary contracts and, as always, 
ultimate responsibility lies with the Minister for Finance and the cabinet. Indeed, 
according to recent media reports, there has already been an attempt by a very large 
public company in Ireland to lobby for an 2900 percent over-weighting of Irish equities 
in the Fund’s portfolio (Suiter 2001).
5 
 
One potential manifestation of the politicisation problem is in battles for corporate 
control. Although section 15 of the Act prohibits the Fund from seeking to take control of 
a firm, much power can be exercised below this threshold: for instance, the Fund could 
be a key “swing” voter in a control contest between two other parties. More generally, if 
the Fund held domestic investment positions, asset sales could attract much criticism as 
being anti-patriotic. 
 
There is a simple way to minimise the risk of politicisation: prohibit any investment in 
Irish assets. Ireland represents only a trivial fraction of world market capitalisation, so 
that a ban on Irish assets would not seriously constrain the range of feasible investments 
for the Fund. In this way, Ireland is more fortunate than the United States: it would not be 
                                                 
5 According to the report, the Smurfit Group requested an Irish equity allocation of 15 percent, although the 
Irish market is only 0.5 percent of world equity capitalisation.   9 
feasible for the United States to accumulate a significant state investment fund composed 
purely of overseas assets.  
 
The Act partially acknowledges this problem by prohibiting the Fund from holding Irish 
government bonds. However, the Fund is permitted to purchase any other kind of Irish 
asset: Irish corporate bonds, Irish publicly-traded equities, Irish private equity, Irish 
venture capital and Irish property.  
 
By rather having a complete legislative bar on domestic assets, the commissioners would 




3.2 An Ethical Investment Policy? 
 
The legislation requires the Fund to maximise returns according to strictly commercial 
criteria. As such, there is no bar on the Fund holding shares in tobacco or alcohol 
companies or in firms engaging in environmentally-unfriendly activities. If there are to be 
ethical constraints on investment policy, these should be specified in the legislation: it 
would be undesirable and indeed illegal for the Fund’s Commissioners to make such 
essentially political decisions.  The lack of a political debate on this question may prove 
to be unwise, if lobbying by activist groups places pressure on the government to amend 
the legislation in future years.   
 
3.3 Budgetary Implications 
 
  
Payments into the Fund have no impact on the General Government Surplus (GGS) 
figures: it is merely a transaction within the general government sector. The converse is 
that alternative strategies --- such as paying down the public debt --- would improve the 
GGS surplus. During the current period of booming tax revenues, it may well be an astute 
domestic political strategy to reduce the headline GGS surplus figure by making  10 
payments into the Fund rather than allocating the revenues to alternative uses. However, 
this strategy is potentially a source of confusions to external assessors that employ the 
GGS surplus as the indicator of fiscal prudence. 
 
The commitment to make payments into the Fund regardless of budgetary conditions will 
place pressure on the Minister of Finance during tough fiscal times. Consider a scenario 
in which Ireland is just hitting the 3 percent deficit/GDP ratio that is red marked in the 
Growth and Stability Pact: the government may forced into larger tax increases or more 
severe public expenditure cuts by the fact that the Fund payment is ring-fenced. Indeed, 
this is the very reason why the commitment was written into the legislation but it will be 
interesting to see if this part of the Act will remain unchanged throughout the projected 
life of the Fund. 
 
There is a very important second dimension to the relation between the Fund and the 
budgetary position. Only the investment income and not the capital gains/losses 
generated by the Fund is counted as part of the GGS.  
 
There are two problems here. First, investment income will inevitably fluctuate on a year-
to-year basis, depending on shifts in world interest rates, equity dividend payments and 
currency movements. This will induce instability in the GGS, which may be especially 
costly if it leads to a violation of the 3 percent deficit rule. 
 
Second, the measured GGS will be larger, the more returns on the Fund take the form of 
investment income rather than capital gains. In this way, the Fund’s Commissioners may 
face implicit pressure from a government that is trying to improve the GGS numbers to 
bias its portfolio towards income-generating assets.   
 
3.4 The One Percent Rule 
 
According to the legislation, one percent of GNP will be paid into the Fund each year. 
This sum is intended to only partially pre-fund anticipated future pension liabilities.  11 
 
The one percent rule has the characteristic of an “automatic stabiliser”: more will be paid 
into the Fund when the economy is growing quickly than during a slowdown. It is an 
open question whether this is an optimal rule in terms of cyclical stabilisation. In Ireland, 
tax revenue elasticities with respect to GNP are typically greater than unity. On this basis, 
a rule that specified a greater percentage would be paid into the Fund during upturns and 
a smaller percentage during downturns may have better stabilisation properties. However, 
the one percent rule has the considerable merits of simplicity and clarity. Moreover, a 
cyclically-adjusted rule would require a reliable decomposition between cycles and trends 
in output growth. This is a notoriously difficult problem, especially for a small open 
economy with an elastic international supply of labour and capital. 
 
 
3.5 The Central Bank Investment Fund 
 
The government already has a very substantial investment fund. This is the fund 
consisting of the former reserve assets of the Central Bank of Ireland.
6 Since Ireland 
joined EMU in 1999, its need to hold foreign exchange reserves has sharply diminished 
and the financial assets of the Central Bank now far exceed the amount it is required to 
hold under its EMU obligations as a member of the European System of Central Banks. 
The Central Bank assets generated net interest income of €240 million in 1999 and 
unrealised capital gains of €648.2 million.
7 As such, the size of the Central Bank fund 
will be much larger than the new Fund, at least for the next few years. 
 
Since the “excess” funds of the Central Bank are not required for currency management, 
the presumable objective is to conditionally maximize the investment return on these 
funds.
8 As such, the goal is quite similar to that of the new Fund, with the potential 
exception of a different investment horizon: the Central Bank remits investment income 
                                                 
6 These assets have been accumulated through seigniorage and capital gains on investments. 
7 See Central Bank of Ireland Annual Report 1999. 
8 Indeed, this is one of the clear and unambiguous gains from EMU: a decline in the need to hold state 
assets in the form of low-return liquid positions. There are some ECB  constraints on the management of 
these funds.  12 
to the Minister of Finance on a contemporaneous basis whereas there is no drawdown 
from the Fund until 2025.  
 
From a consolidated government balance sheet perspective, it would be optimal to 
coordinate the investment strategies of the Central Bank and the new Fund. One option is 
to transfer the Bank’s excess assets to the new Fund. However, that step would eliminate 
one source of current income for the Minister of Finance. Another is for an exchange of 
information between the Bank and the new Commission or the NTMA: however, it is not 
clear which should be the “lead” party in this relationship. A coherent policy statement 
on the desired role of the Bank’s excess assets is required to properly address these 
questions. The impending reorganisation of the Central Bank may provide a useful 
opportunity in this regard. 
 
3.6 Social Welfare Pensions versus Public Sector Pensions 
 
The objective of the Fund is to partly pre-fund future social welfare and public sector 
pension liabilities. The legislation leaves open the possibility of creating two separate 
Funds in the future to reflect these two functions. In general, there are clear distinctions 
between the two types of pension liabilities. The social welfare pension is not related to 
earnings and is essentially a minimal anti-poverty measure.  As such, maintaining an 
adequate social welfare pension (at least as currently designed) will plausibly always be 
the responsibility of the state and the social welfare pension fund is essentially just a 
means for the government to efficiently smooth revenue streams. 
 
The pensions of public sector workers rather are much more similar to a standard 
defined-benefit private pensions scheme. For the latter group, one can think of alternative 
ways to pre-fund pensions and to organise the management of the fund. For instance, a 
defined contribution scheme could be envisaged for public sector workers and even 
individual retirement accounts, with each employee making a personal choice re 
risk/return tradeoffs and the design of her personal retirement fund. Even under a model 
in which the public sector employee fund were collectively invested, its managers would  13 
be much more directly accountable to the public sector workforce, which is a different 
design to the current set-up for the Fund. 
 
 
4. The Investment Strategy for the Fund 
 
The objective of the Fund is to meet  
 
“as much as possible of the cost to the Exchequer of social welfare pensions and public 
sector pensions to be paid from the year 2025 until the year 2055 …” (section 18 (1) of 
the National Pensions Reserve Fund 2000).  
 
To this end, the Commission has been granted   
 
“a strictly commercial investment mandate for the Fund with the objective of securing the 
optimal return over the long-term subject to prudent risk management” (Department of 
Finance 2000b). 
 
In this section, we analyse some issues concerning the optimal investment strategy for the 
Fund. 
 
4.1 The Four Stages of the Fund’s Life Cycle 
 
We can think of the Fund as evolving through four stages. The first stage is the initiation 
phase during which the Fund invests the current cash pile. There are potentially some 
timing issues as to how quickly the Fund attains its “optimal portfolio” but this 
implementation problem is beyond the scope of this paper. The second stage is the pure 
accumulation phase running until 2025. During this interval, there will be no withdrawals 
from the fund. The third stage is the 2025-2055 period during which there will still be 
new inflows into the fund but also annual withdrawals. The fourth and final stage is the  14 




In thinking about the appropriate investment strategy of the Fund, I will focus on the 
second and third stages of the Fund’s life cycle.  
 
4.2 The Second Stage  
 
Finance theory broadly distinguishes between three asset classes: cash, bonds and equity.  
Bonds and equity can be jointly considered the set of “risky” assets.
10 One decision 
facing an investor is the share of the portfolio that should be allocated to risky assets. The 
existence of an “equity premium” --- higher average returns on equity than on bonds --- 
also means that the investor must also decide the composition of the risky part of the 
portfolio between equity and bonds. 
 
Recent developments in portfolio theory suggest that an investor can afford to be more 
aggressive, the longer is the investment horizon (Barberis 2000, Campbell and Viceira 
2000, Viceira 2001). One reason is that equity returns are less volatile, the longer is the 
investment horizon. Another is that financial assets form a smaller part of total wealth 
(including human capital) the further way is an investor from retirement, so that such an 
investor can afford to be more aggressive in accepting risk in return for high potential 
returns. As the financial portfolio grows in importance in total wealth, the optimal 
investment strategy becomes less aggressive over time.   
 
With respect to the public equity allocation, a natural benchmark is for the Fund to “hold 
the world”.  What would justify deviations from this neutral strategy? 
 
                                                 
9 The legislation allows for the end-date to be extended beyond 2055 but we take it as fixed for 
convenience. 
10 The absence of inflation indexation and time variation in the real interest rate means that cash is not 
strictly risk-free but we adopt the conventional terminology here. The riskiness of cash is dealt with later in 
this section.  15 
From a macroeconomic viewpoint, one may wish to take into account the co-variation of 
equity returns with some large and identifiable macroeconomic risks to the Irish 
economy. For instance, it is plausible that the Irish output growth  positively depends on 
economic developments in our major trading partners.
11 As such, to hedge against the 
risk of slow growth at home, it may be wise to underweight our trading partners in the 
design of the Fund’s portfolio.
12  
 
By similar logic, the portfolio weights that are allocated to those industrial sectors in 
which Ireland specialises may need some adjustment. It is actually ambiguous whether 
these sectors should be over-weighted or under-weighted in the Fund’s portfolio.
13 Put 
differently, is what is good for Intel also good for Ireland? For instance, if Intel 
discovered a more attractive location and shifted production out of Ireland, the fortunes 
of Intel and Ireland would move in opposite directions. In this case, a natural hedge is for 
the Fund to own Intel stock. On the other hand, a negative technological or competitive 
shock that hurt Intel and also caused it to contract production in Ireland would see the 
fortunes of Intel and Ireland moving in the same direction. Here, the appropriate hedge is 
to underweight or even go short in Intel’s equity. Assessing the balance of risk requires 
detailed sectoral- and firm-level analysis: this may be an interesting avenue for future 
research in modelling the optimal portfolio for the Fund. 
 
Beyond these systematic macroeconomic and sectoral risks, there may also be some 
scope for active management to exploit some potential “gaps” in the market. Here, it is 
important to take into account the impact of active management strategies on overall 
portfolio risk by understanding the correlations of the returns on actively-managed stocks 
with other components of the portfolio.
14 To some extent, this risk analysis can be 
                                                 
11 For instance, there is evidence that international diffusion of productivity innovations follows trade 
patterns (Coe and Helpman 1995). FDI and migration patterns provide other mechanisms that link 
productivity growth across nations. 
12 Honohan and Lane (2000b) however show that our trading partners are actually heavily represented in 
Irish investment portfolios. In particular, the UK is strikingly over-represented. That paper discusses the 
potential explanations for this apparent sub-optimality. See also Lane (2000b) on Irish international 
financial diversification. 
13 See also Davis and Willen (2000). 
14 Returns should of course be measured net of the higher fees charged by active managers.  16 
conducted using historical correlation patterns. However, historical correlation matrices 
are of limited value during periods of market illiquidity and with respect to shares in 
entirely-new sectors (such as internet stocks).
15 Moreover, it is difficult to work out 
potential covariation patterns between publicly-traded assets and more illiquid assets such 
as private equity, venture capital and property investments. 
 
Finally, a long horizon also means that cash is a risky investment, since it must be 
reinvested at uncertain real interest rates. Accordingly, the conservative part of the 
portfolio should largely take the form of long-term bonds rather than cash, since this 
hedges against the risk of a decline in real interest rates (Campbell and Viceira 2001). 
 
4.3 The Third Stage 
 
During the third stage, the Fund will be making contributions to the fiscal budget to ease 
the costs of the increased pension burden that is expected after 2025. As such, the 
investment horizon will naturally be shorter and the mix of the fund will shift away from 
equities and towards bonds and cash. However, the fact that the peak of the Irish pensions 
burden is not expected until around 2050 means that the investment horizon should 
actually remain quite long, with only a gradual shift out of equities in the initial years 
after 2025. 
 
However, the short-term co-variances between Irish fiscal variables and asset returns may 
take on greater importance in portfolio selection during this third stage.  Ideally, the 
payout from the Fund to the Exchequer should stabilise the fiscal positions, with a larger 
payout being made during recessions than in expansions. This can be best achieved if the 
Fund’s return negatively covaries with domestic tax revenues and positively covaries 
with domestic public spending needs.
16  
 
                                                 
15 See Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Lowenstein (2000). 
16 See Lloyd-Ellis and Zhu (2000).  17 
 
4.4 Some Empirical Analysis 
 
In this subsection, we conduct some empirical analysis that illustrates the potential 
importance of taking into account the co-variation between domestic macroeconomic 
performance and international asset returns. 
 
In Table 3, we regress Irish output growth on international equity returns and bond 
yields.
17 Column (1) just includes the return on the MSCI world equity index (EQW) and 
a GDP-weighted average world bond yield (BW).
18 This simple specification does quite 
well in terms of “explaining” 30 percent of the movement in Irish output. Importantly, 
Irish growth negatively co-varies with the world equity return and world bond yield: 
holding positive positions in these financial assets provides a hedge against Irish output 
risk. 
 
In columns (2)-(5), we add additional country-level asset returns.
19 The addition of the 
UK and US in columns (2) and (3) do improve the fit of the regression and the most 
striking finding is that, holding fixed world asset returns, there is positive co-variation 
between UK and US financial returns and Irish growth. The implication is that hedging 
would require us to underweight UK and US assets relative to their importance in world 
financial indices.  
 
In columns (4) and (5), we see that there is essentially no relation between German asset 
returns and Irish growth performance but that addition of Japan improves explanatory 
power to some extent. Here, the point estimate indicates that Irish growth negatively co-
varies with the Japanese bond yield, suggesting that Japan should perhaps be over-
weighted in the bond component of the Fund. 
                                                 
17 These asset returns are adjusted for currency depreciation and inflation to obtain the real returns that 
matter to Irish investors. See also Davis et al (2001). 
18 The bond yield is on 10-year government bonds and the world index includes the United States, Japan, 
Germany and the United Kingdom. Ideally, one would like to use the total bond return but these data were 
not to hand. 
19 Limited degrees of freedom means that we add countries one-at-a-time.  18 
 
 
Table 3. Irish Growth and International Asset Returns 
Note: Absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are HAC-corrected, 
using the Newey-West procedure. Chi-Sq is the test of the joint significance of the 
country equity return and bond yield (p-value in parentheses). 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
EQW -0.039 -0.079 -0.141 -0.052 -0.133
(1.67) (2.82) (2.5) (1.97) (2.41)
BW -0.84 -0.88 -1.34 -0.568 -0.51

















Chi-Sq 21.88 13.64 3.91 4.8
(.001) (.001) (.142) (.091)
adj.R2 0.3 0.33 0.39 0.27 0.38 19 
 
The results in Table 3 are clearly only a crude first step in thinking about the relation 
between international financial returns and Irish macroeconomic performance. It would 
be interesting to extend this analysis to look at the relation between asset returns and Irish 
fiscal variables (aggregate and subcomponents of public expenditure, tax revenue and the 
fiscal deficit) and consider a broader array of asset returns. The historical returns are 
clearly also only a limited guide to the future: in particular, Ireland’s membership of 
EMU means that the co-variation of Irish domestic variables and currency fluctuations is 
likely to be quite different.  
 







Source: Honohan and Lane (2000b). 
 
 
Honohan and Lane (2000b) provide an alternative empirical approach. In that paper, the 
authors calculated the matrix of return correlations over 1970-97 between Irish national 
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States, Germany and Japan.
20 On the assumption that the return correlations remain 
stable, the authors were then able to compute the geographical composition of the mean-
variance efficient portfolio.
21  Figure 4 reveals that the efficient portfolio would not be 
heavily weighted in UK and German assets: on the contrary, it would involve negative 
holdings (short sales) of UK stocks and near-zero holdings of German stocks in order to 
finance higher holdings of Japanese and US assets.  Again, the mean-variance 
calculations clearly are not an adequate basis for portfolio decisions but the exercise 
reinforces the point that the co-variance between domestic macroeconomic and fiscal 
variables and financial returns should be incorporated into the design of the Fund’s 
portfolio. 
 
In the foregoing, we have examined country-level returns. For the reasons noted above, it 
would be useful to also examine the co-movement between domestic macroeconomic and 
fiscal variables with sectoral returns --- for instance, what is the covariance between Irish 
tax revenue and the global high-technology sector? 
 
 
5. The Management of the Fund 
 
In this section, we discuss some corporate governance and operational issues in the 
management of the Fund. Box 5.1 at the end of the section contains a case study of the 
Norwegian Government Petroleum Fund which also provides some useful lessons for the 
design of the new Fund. 
 
Under the legislation, a Commission will be appointed to oversee the Fund. It will be 
responsible for setting the investment strategy for the Fund. The NTMA will be the 
manager of the Fund and its chief executive is ex-officio also a member of the 
                                                 
20 See also Bodie and Merton (2000). 
21 The calculation also requires some assumption about mean and variance of future returns.  We 
experimented with various assumptions here, including (i) the use of historic values, (ii) imposition of 
common mean and variance across countries, (iii) increasing the assumed mean return for Ireland to reflect 
home preference.  While different assumptions do change the efficient portfolio, the qualitative conclusions 
were unaffected.  21 
Commission. The Commission will perform all its functions through the Manager and it 
is also free to delegate any of its functions to the Manager. The NTMA has been initially 
appointed for a ten-year period: after that, the management contract will be five years in 
duration and the Commission will be free to appoint another agent as manager of the 
Fund. The legislation requires the Commission to make an annual report to the Minister 
of Finance. The Oireachtas Committee on Public Accounts will also be free to interview 
the Chairman of the Commission and the Chief Executive of the Manager.  
 
This structure has the considerable advantage of avoiding the need to establish an all-new 
agency to manage the Fund. However, its formal organisation has some debatable 
features. First, the Commission does not have freedom in the first ten years in its choice 
of manager. It has no direct power to fire the chief executive of the Fund, since the head 
of the NTMA is appointed by the Minister of Finance. Moreover, the head of the NTMA 
is also a member of the Commission: as the only “executive” member, he will have an 
extraordinarily influential position within the Commission. The special status of the 
NTMA head is reinforced by the fact that the Manager has been appointed for ten years 
whereas the longest contract for the other Commissioners is only five years.
22 
 
The option to delegate any (all) functions to the manager further enhances the potential 
power of the manager. For instance, the legislation could permit the NTMA to set its own 
benchmark, if the Commission delegated this function to it. Standard corporate 
governance principles suggest that this structure may be unstable. Indeed, it is hard to see 
how the NTMA could be replaced even at the end of its initial contract since the 
advantages of incumbency are potentially very high under the legislation. Still, the option 
to change managers will presumably curb to some extent incentives to “empire build” on 
the part of the NTMA. 
 
In managing the Fund, it is anticipated that the NTMA will employ an array of external 
managers, especially in investing the equity component of the Fund. Keeping a lid on 
                                                 
22 The Chairman is appointed for five years. The ordinary members of the Commission will be appointed 
for three or four years.  22 
management fees will be an important factor in determining the Fund’s overall net return 
so that it is to be hoped that intense competition among external managers will shave fees 
to a minimum. The instruction and monitoring of the external managers will be a major 
responsibility for the NTMA. 
 
The optimal reporting frequency on the performance of the Fund is an interesting 
problem. The legislation mandates an annual report but the Commission could voluntarily 
release information at a higher frequency (say, quarterly) if it wished. On the one side, 
more frequent reporting would promote transparency and openness. On the other, at least 
in its early stages, the projected investment horizon for the Fund is twenty-five/fifty-five 
years such that high-frequency reporting may distort the behaviour of the Fund by 
placing the manager under pressure to produce high short-term returns, even at the 
expense of worse long-term performance. 
 
In general, the long-term investment horizon makes proper evaluation of the Fund’s 
performance a very difficult technical question. Evaluation really has three parts: (a) is 
the benchmark portfolio optimally designed?; (b) are deviations from the benchmark 
justifiable?; (c) has the operation of the fund been efficient and cost effective? Part (a) is 
at least initially the responsibility of the Commission; part (b) is the responsibility of the 
manager, if it is given the freedom to depart from the benchmark; and part (c) refers to 
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Box 5.1 A Case Study: Norway’s Government Petroleum Fund 
 
Norway established the Government Petroleum Fund (GPF) in 1990 to invest part of its 
significant oil revenues.
 23 The objective is to accumulate assets that will generate 
investment income for the government in future years, when oil revenues decline and the 
burden of rising pension expenditures becomes more severe.
24  
 
The Norwegian Ministry of Finance directs the GPF’s investment strategy, with the 
Norwegian Central Bank charged with its management. The resources of the Ministry of 
Finance means that it is not reliant on the manager for advice on strategy, providing a 
high degree of independence between the “trustees” and the “manager”. The Ministry of 
Finance sets the benchmark portfolio: fixing the allocation between equity and fixed-
income instruments and the geographical spread within each asset class. The manager has 
some limited freedom to depart from this benchmark but the actual portfolio may never 
deviate from the benchmark portfolio to the extent that annualised expected tracking error 
exceeds 1.5 percentage points.
25 
 
None of the capital of the GPF is invested in Norway. As such, the politicisation problem 
in setting and executing investment strategy is eliminated.
26 To further avoid control 
problems, the GPF can hold only a maximum of 3 percent of the share capital (or of the 
voting shares) in any one firm. 
                                                 
23 See the elaborate and detailed web site for the Norwegian Petroleum Fund at http://www.norges-
bank.no/english/petroleum_fund 
24 The GPF is not formally a pension fund but the rising pensions burden is cited as a motive for its 
establishment. 
25 Expected tracking error is defined as the expected value of the standard deviation of the difference 
between the annual return on actual investments and the return on the benchmark portfolio. This means 
that, over time, the difference between the returns on the actual portfolio and the benchmark portfolio will 
be less than 1.5 percentage points in two out of three years. The tracking error is calculated using the 
BARRA risk-management model. 
26 However, there is a vigorous political debate in Norway about the trade-off between current consumption 




This paper has reviewed some key issues in understanding the role to be played by the 
new National Pensions Reserve Fund. In particular, we have emphasised the importance 
of avoiding the politicisation of investment policy. To this end, it is regrettable that the 
Act failed to prohibit investment in domestic assets. 
 
The long horizon of the Fund suggests that it initially should be largely invested in 
equities. Within the equity allocation, it is desirable to take into account the pattern of 
national and sectoral co-variation with Irish macroeconomic and fiscal variables, since 
the goal of the Fund is to supplement the Irish public finances. Much more research on 
this question is required. Comprehensive risk assessment of the actively-managed 
components of the Fund is also highly important but this is a very difficult task, since 
evaluation cannot solely rely on historical return correlation matrices. 
 
Finally, we have also raised some questions about the organisational structure of the 
Fund. In particular, the relation between the Commission and the Manager is quite fluid 
in the legislation. It will be interesting to observe how the operation of the Fund evolves 
over time.  25 
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